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Horizontal mergers with synergies : cash vs. profit-share auctions
Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: International journal of industrial organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 382-391
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010247687
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Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction
Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008685480
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Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions
Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 382-391
profit-share auctions, first- and second-price, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if …. Unlike cash auctions, profit-share auctions are not revenue equivalent, and the second-price profit-share auction is more … profitable than the other auctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730067
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Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010668400
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Institute of Economic Research, Korea University - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer¡¯s type, which drives a unique separating and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010705929
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Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 388-402
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049835
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Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140993
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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of … outperform all other auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556730
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License auctions with exit (and entry) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem
Hu, Luke; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010602240