Showing 1 - 10 of 70
Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011014394
Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implication of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to non-convex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008500332
This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the principle of "equal opportunity" for all players to make the recommendation on resource allocations. A framework in such a context is developed and the egalitarian solution to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008500365
Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009145635
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574177
This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, "Pillage and property"), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games' predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents' intrinsic contributions to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012388911
This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, "Pillage and property"), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games' predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents' intrinsic contributions to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131700
This paper studies the Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. The Nash solution in such a context is typically multi-valued. We introduce a procedure to exclude some options recommended by the Nash solution. The procedure is based on the idea of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution which has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195410
This paper studies the Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. The Nash solution in such a context is typically multi-valued. We introduce a procedure to exclude some options recommended by the Nash solution. The procedure is based on the idea of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution which has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009143619
This paper analyzes the persistency of the unequal exchange of labor (UE) in international trade. An intertemporal model of a world economy is defined with a leisure preference and no discount factor. Every incompletely specialized free trade equilibrium is characterized as having non-persistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012059913