We consider a differential game with a corrupt government and civil society as its players. We characterize open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria and find that, whereas it is in the best interest of the government not to commit to a repression policy, civil society is better off precommitting...

In this paper we study a dynamic two-player channel where the manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the investment in quality and the retailer chooses the retail price. We consider that the retail price affects both the demand and the perceived quality of the brand and that its...

This paper considers a differential game model of a simple marketing channel formed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer controls the advertising in the brand equity and the wholesale price and the retailer the promotion of the brand and its price to consumer. The paper shows...

The paper investigates the impact of retailer's myopic behavior on the strategies and outcomes of channel members. Myopia means that the retailer disregards the evolution of the state of the system when optimizing her payoff. The channel is formed of a single manufacturer selling her product...

We revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game in which firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under...