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Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Miller, Nolan; Pratt, John W.; Zeckhauser, Richard; … - In: Journal of economic theory 136 (2007) 1, pp. 476-496

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003552143

Private truths and public consequences

Johnson, Scott J.; Pratt, John W.; Zeckhauser, Richard - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000887518

Efficiency despite mutually payoff-relevant private information : the finite case

Johnson, Scott J. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 58 (1990) 4, pp. 873-900

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001091335

Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Miller, Nolan; Pratt, John W.; Zeckhauser, Richard; … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003363926

Efficient design with multidimentional, continuous types, and interdependent valuations

Johnson, Scott Lee; Miller, Nolan; Pratt, John W.; … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001872447

Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations

Johnson, Scott; Miller, Nolan; Pratt, John W.; … - Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University - 2003

We consider mechanism design in social choice problems in which agents’ types are continuous, multidimensional, and mutually payoff-relevant, and there are three or more agents. If the center receives a signal that is stochastically related to the agents’ types and direct returns are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005553800