This paper analyzes how agency problems in nancial contracting determine risk-taking andinvestment. In perfect capital markets a risk-neutral rm would invest until the expectedmarginal return equals the interest rate. However, as rms with little net-worth face agencycost in nancial contracting...

The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the...

This paper deals with a moral hazard problem resulting from a combined hidden action and hidden information situation.

We analyze optimal contract choice in agriculture when there is joint moral hazard onthe part of the farmer in the supply of effort and the riskiness of the technique ofcultivation. In the presence of limited liability, high-powered incentive contracts such asfixed rental contracts will induce...

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirableactivity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability?When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction?This paper shows that any restriction of implementabilityis caused by an identification...

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financialtransactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs,public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influenceconsumption allocation. We show...

In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative projects,design incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio companies with valueenhancing managerial advice. This paper considers how venture capitalists can induce selfselectionamong...

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often placeemployees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second,demotions are extremely rare...

We analyse pricing, e¤ort and tipping decisions in the online service GoogleAnswers. While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, theycan additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post.In line with the related experimental literature we …nd evidence that tippingis...

We consider guilt averse agents and principals and study the effects ofguilt on optimal behavior of the principal and the agent in a moral hazardmodel.The principal’s contract proposal contains a target effort in addition tothe monetary incentive scheme. By accepting the agreement, the...