We demonstrate that in simple 2 X 2 games (cumulative) prospect theorypreferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players withprospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. Thisholds also if probability weighting is applied to the probabilities of...

We study how the framework of classical game theory changes whenthe preferences of the players are described by Prospect Theory (PT)and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) instead of Expected UtilityTheory. Specically, we study the inuence of framing eects and probabilityweighting on the existence...

Dieser Beitrag erweitert die Standardmodellierung der Literatur über Informationsaustausch zwischen Unternehmen bei Nachfrageunsicherheit und läßt sich vor allem auf Unternehmen in neuen Branchen oder in unsicheren Märkten anwenden ...

If a manager stays in office for a long time he will have learned much about his subordinates. Thus competition among them will be weak as the manager has made up his mind who is suited best for which position. With a new manager the "race" for favorable tasks is restarted leading subordinates...

In this paper we show that reputation formation in endogenously formed relationships is a decisive determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In theabsence of any third party enforcement of debt repayment the contracting parties succeed in establishing stable bilateral...

Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. Weshow that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided everyparticipant considers accepting money as a reasonable...

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralizedmarkets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationarymonetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity ofmoney. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual be-havior in a...

A unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned bygroup of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating theothers monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel,Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically and...

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of anasset market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assetspay dividends that are partially consumed and partially rein-vested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfo-lio rules), distributing their wealth between...

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...