In vielen psychologischen Studien wurde gezeigt, dass Feedback als Motivator innerhalb einer Arbeitsbeziehung wirkt. In diesem Papier soll nun die Wirkung von Feedback mit Methoden der Ökonomie untersucht werden. Dazu wird der Einfluss von Feedback auf die Arbeitsanstrengung des Agenten in...

Globalisierung und Deregulierung bringen den Unternehmen in vielerlei Hinsichtneue Möglichkeiten, ihr wirtschaftliches Handeln zu optimieren. Aber sowie durch diesen schnellen Wandel und die steigende Komplexität von Geschäftenmehr Optionen entstehen, werden auch immer mehr neuartige...

The past decades witnessed a broad trend towards flatter organizations with lesshierarchical layers. A reduction of the number of management levels in a corporationcan have both positive and negative effects on firm performance with the neteffect being theoretically unclear ex ante. The present...

The Peter Principle states that, after a promotion, the observed output of promotedemployees tends to fall. Lazear (2004) models this principle as resulting from a regression tothe mean of the transitory component of ability...

In this paper we study the joint decision process of changing the structure of jobs and layingoff individual workers in a firm that downsizes its workforce. A hierarchical decision model isproposed and estimated using personnel data from a firm in demise comparing thecharacteristics of the...

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players.At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stagetwo, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneouslyinvest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoreticallyand then tested by using...

This paper assesses the impact of product market competition on job instability as proxied bythe use of fixed-term labor contracts. Using both worker data from the Spanish Labor ForceSurvey and firm data from the Spanish Business Strategies Survey, I show that job instabilityrises with...

This paper analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...

In this paper I contrast the impact of precision, i.e., the level of accuracy with which workers' performance is assessed, on wage costs in U- and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments prizes are fixed. In J-type tournaments only anoverall wage sum is specified. The principal can increase...

This paper analyzes the independence of boards of directors as an optimally chosen, non-contractible behavior. A board behaves loyally to a CEO when it agrees to a negative NPV-pro ject, giving the CEO private benefits. While the CEO benefitsfrom competent directors because they help him make...