We combine profit sharing and outsourcing, if the wage for worker is decided by a labor unionto analyze how does the implementation of profit sharing affect individual effort and thebargained wage and thus outsourcing? We find that profit sharing and the wage level havean individual...

The discussion on value-based performance measures is centered around the concept of residualincome. The main property of residual income is its connection to capital budgeting and the net-present-value-rule. This property is, however, not sufficient to guarantee strong goal congruencebetween...

This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk averse and has specific knowledge - knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and...

We investigate the observable determinants of sorting between salary and performace pay jobs, the extent to which wage functions differ between the two, and the magnitude of the unobserved ability differential between salary and performance pay workers...

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

We analyze the following questions associated with outsourcing and profit sharing under imperfect labour markets. How does strategic outsourcing influence wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort when firms commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or decide for profit...

This paper develops a framework for studying individuals ideas about what constitutes justcompensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) and reports estimates of just CEO pay andthe principles guiding ideas of justice. The sample consists of students pursuing a Master ofBusiness Administration...

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close agap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy atthe beginning of the tournament...

This paper uses matched employer-employee panel data to show that individual jobsatisfaction is higher when other workers in the same establishment are better-paid. Thisruns contrary to a large literature which has found evidence of income comparisons insubjective well-being...

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within therealm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme,the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure...