The paper discusses the role of various constituencies in the corporate governance of a corporation from the perspective of incomplete contracts. A strict shareholder value orientation in the sense of a rule that at any time firm decisions should be made strictly in the interest of the present...

This paper investigates four common features (covenants) of venture capital investment contracts from a real option perspective, using both analytical solutions and numerical analysis to draw inferences for a better understanding of contract features.

In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter intodynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimalterminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the workerwho is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and...

Researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions in isolation within simple neoclassical models to open up a role for institutions, inject realism into their models and examine the impact of these distortions on output and employment. We present an overlapping generations model...

This paper analyses the empirical determinants of contract length, a key andyet neglected dimension of contractual structure. I estimate contract length andcontract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between1870 and 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy.The findings...

We analyze optimal contracts and optimal matching patterns in a simple model of partnershipwhere there is a double-sided moral hazard problem and potential partners differ intheir productivity in two tasks. It is possible for one individual to accomplish both tasks (soleproduction) and there are...

This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of high-frequency repayment, a featurein nearly all microfi…nance contracts that has been largely overlooked by theorists. The pervasive belief among practitioners that frequent repayment is critical in achieving high repaymentrates is puzzling....

This paper analyzes the role of public and private responsibility in the provision of publicgoods. We emphasize that a typical public good will require many different inputs whichraises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties.But hold-up problems...

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterize optimal separating joint liability contracts...