Sportwetten werden in Deutschland in der Marktordnung eines Veranstaltungsmonopolsder öffentlichen Hand vergleichbar den Lotterien reguliert. Das Monopol wurde vom Bundesverfassungsgerichtim März 2006 in der bisherigen Form als rechtlich unzulässiges Fiskalmonopol verworfen. Demnach ist...

We analyze market dynamics under Bertrand duopoly competition in industries with network effects and consumer switching costs. Consumers form installed bases, repeatedly buy the products, and differ with respect to their switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network...

Firms protected by antidumping measures do not unequivocally benefit from them. Antidumpingprotection benefits non-exporters active on the protected market by raising their domestic sales, buthurts exporters of similar products as the protected ones. Export sales of protected firms fall byalmost...

We analyze the relationship between Antidumping (AD) Protection and the productivity ofEU domestic firms in import-competing industries. For this purpose we identify a panel ofdomestic firms between 1993 and 2003 that at some point during this period are affected byAD initiations. Using a...

This paper analyses how competition over rebates for customer loyalty across product lines affects firms` pricing and consumers generally. If buyers incur firm specific costs or have shop specific tastes then competitive loyalty discounts lower consumer surplus overall and raise profits - the...

The aim of this paper is to test whether patent-based indicators are still reliable measures of innovativeness in light of organizational changes in the field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection and the regulatory reforms already under way respectively at the U.S. Patent and...

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. Incontrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product marketadvantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage inthe labor market. With unionized labor market, we...

An important discussion in recent years is the introduction of product patentsand the abolition of process patents. In a model with endogenous number of innovatingfirms, we show that whether product patent increases R&D is ambiguous, and depends onthe type of market demand and the cost of R&D....