Voluntary opt-in programs to reduce emissions in unregulated sectors or countries have spurred considerable discussion. Since any regulator will make errors in predicting baselines and participants will self-select into the program, adverse selection will reduce efficiency and possibly...

In earlier papers we have argued that the Kyoto Protocol is not sustainable as a global climate change policy and have proposed an alternative policy regime based on a coordinated but decentralized system of national permit trading systems with a fixed internationally negotiated price for...

Die Dissertation beleuchtet aus ?konomischer Sicht die Thematik des Klimawandels mit dem Ziel, Ans?tze einer technologischen Kooperation zu identifizieren, die zu einer Verbesserung der Nutzen-Kosten-Relation in internationalen Klimaschutzverhandlungen beitragen k?nnten. Besonderer Wert wird...

One of the main concerns associated with the development and use of regional CGE models is the determination of key parameter values, particularly substitution and other price elasticities. A common problem is the lack of appropriate regional data for econometric estimation. Consequently, it is...

This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emis-sions trading in a two-sector (clean and dirty) economy. We compare the welfare implica-tions of an absolute cap-and-trade scheme (permit trading) with a relative intensity-basedscheme (credit trading). We nd...

Emissions trading can be organized in several ways. In particular, private emissions trading can be organized as permit trading, or as credit trading. The schemes have a different impact on output with credit trading leading to a higher output level than permit trading. This paper analyzes what...

This paper presents a model of imperfect international competition. Within this framework, the optimal choice of national environmental policy instrument and international emissions trading scheme is discussed. The choice of national instrument is restricted to absolute and relative standards,...

Cap-and-trade programs have become widely accepted for the control of conventional air pollution in the United States. However, there is still no political consensus to use these programs to address greenhouse gases. Meanwhile, in the wake of the success of the U.S. SO2 and NOx trading programs,...

Rate-based emissions policies (like tradable performance standards) fix average emissions intensity, while cap-and-trade policies fix total emissions. This paper shows that unfettered trade between rate-based and cap-and-trade programs always raises combined emissions, except when product...

The choice of mechanism for allocating tradable emissions permits has important efficiency and distributional effects when tax and trade distortions are considered. We present different rules for allocating carbon allowances within sectors (lump-sum grandfathering, output-based allocation [OBA],...