There is a growing concern that U.S. merger control may have been too lenient, but empirical evidence remains limited. Event studies have been used as one method to acquire empirical insights into the competitive effects of mergers. However, existing work suffers from strong identifying...

A novel debate within competition policy and regulation circles is whether autonomous machine learning algorithms may learn to collude on prices. We show that when fims face short-run price commitments, independent Q-learning (a simple but well-established self-learning algorithm) learns to...

There is a growing concern that U.S. merger control may have been too lenient, but empirical evidence remains limited. After reviewing event studies as a method to acquire empirical insights into the competitive effects of mergers, I propose a novel application using Hoberg-Phillips TNIC data....

Benchmark rates, such as Libor and Euribor, have been proven vulnerable to manipulation. We analyze benchmark rate collusion, which is challenging due to varying and opposing trading interests of the subset of market participants that determine the rates. Our theory is based on two mechanisms....

We revisit classic cartel stability theory to show how comparative statics on sustainability change when firms require a margin before colluding. Such a margin can compensate, for instance, for the cost of colluding, antitrust liabilities or the risk of cartel breakdown. We show that the cartel...

Benchmark rates, such as Libor and Euribor, are proven vulnerable to manipulation. We analyze benchmark rate collusion, which is challenging due to varying and opposing trading interests of the subset of market participants that determine the rates. Our theory is based on two mechanisms. We...

The fixing of the Libor and Euribor benchmark rates has proven vulnerable to manipulation. Individual rate-setters may have incentives to fraudulently distort their submissions. For the contributing banks to collectively agree on the direction in which to rig the rate, however, their interests...

Prices are increasingly set by algorithms. One concern is that intelligent algorithms may learn to collude on higher prices even in the absence of the kind of coordination necessary to establish an antitrust infringement. However, exactly how this may happen is an open question. I show how in...

Should companies be allowed to cooperate—or ‘collude’—on socially beneficial environmental behaviour? Do companies even have the incentive to cooperate on socially beneficial behaviour? In this article, we reconcile apparently divergent views concerning the law and economics of the value...