In banking practice, quantifying the probability of default is one of the most important elements of the lending decision, therefore it is also vital from a financial stability perspective. The aim of our research was to model the probability of default as precisely as possible in the case of...

The paper reviews models of the physician-patient relationship to derive testable hypotheses about the relation between health, demand for medical services and patient's compliance. The models imply that in addition to existing information asymmetries the actions that physician and patient...

We analyze a rating agency's incentives to distort ratings in a model with a monopolistic profit maximizing rating agency, a continuum of heterogeneous firms, and a competitive market of risk-neutral investors. Firms sell bonds, the value of a firm's bond is known to the firm and observable by...

We study a model in which an issuer can manipulate information obtained by a credit rating agency (CRA). Better CRA screening reduces the likelihood of a high rating, but increases the value of a rated security. We find that improving the prior quality of assets can have no effect on the quality...

Bank lending standards vary over time. Periods in which firms find it relatively easy to borrow are followed by periods in which banks scrutinize borrowers more and tighten lending. We predict that changes in lending standards affect the accounting conservatism of bank-dependent firms. Using (i)...

Institutional factors that enhance the quality of financial reporting and sharing of credit information can alleviate informational gaps between contracting parties and improve loan contract terms. Using cross-country data on syndicated loans, we find that the cost of debt financing is lower for...

This paper extends Ghatak (1999)'s base model of group lending with asymmetric information by allowing individuals to differ both in their exogenous risk type and in their endogenous effort level. We find that joint liability leads to positive assortative matching in both a non-cooperative and a...

Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex-ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and...

By employing a sample of 20,956 observations of non-financial SMEs headquartered in the Euro area, between 2009 and 2015, we test whether young businesses are more likely to face credit rejections from lenders than their older peers. Our findings appear to confirm our suspicions that new...