This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules....

We consider a shared ownership arrangement among consumers/owners as a means to organize production with an underlying decreasing average cost function typical of natural monopolies. The resulting output allocation yields a lower deadweight loss than the monopoly allocation, and is, in some...

Suppose that (X,A) is a measurable space and Y is a metrizable, Souslin space. Let Au denote the universal completion of A. Given f : X x Y !R and x 2 X, let f (x,xc) be the lower semicontinuous hull of f (x,xc). If f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable, then f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable.

We obtain conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game with infinitely many types and/or strategies that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The main existence results are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions.

The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact...