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Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

van Damme, Eric; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1999

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334682

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

Weibull, Jörgen W.; van Damme, Eric - 1998

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334690

What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?

Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1997

framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to … economic theory has lead to new predictions and opened up doors to other social sciences. The discussion will be focused on the … in evolutionary game theory so far? What are the next challenges for evolutionary game theory in economics? …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334821

Local Payoff Security and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Reny, Philip J. - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335145

Product Differentiation and the Sustainability of Collusion

Häckner, Jonas - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335148

Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael B.; Shalev, Jonathan - 1998

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for a fixed number of periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period;...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608403

Game theory and international environmental co-operation: A survey with an application to the Kyoto-Protocol

Finus, Michael - 2000

analysis are characterised. On the other hand, practical problems which are not covered by theory are mentioned and evaluated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608649

Environmental dilemmas revisited: structural consequences from the angle of institutional ergonomics

Beckenkamp, Martin - 2009

The structure of a social dilemma lies behind many environmental problems. Mingling temporal aspects of resources with the structure of the social dilemma often leads to wrong conclusions. Therefore, it is worth analytically separating temporal aspects from structural aspects of the dilemma....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266983

Under-connected and over-connected networks

Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim - 2008

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272547

Convexity and complementarity in network formation: Implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks

Hellmann, Tim - 2009

This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272600