In this paper, we explore a dynamical version of by Aoki and Yoshikawa model (AYM) for an economy driven by demand. We show that when an appropriate Markovian dynamics is taken into account, AYM has different equilibrium distributions depending on the form of transition probabilities. In the...

A large market economy has a huge number of degrees of freedom with weak microlevel coordination. The 'implicit microfoundations' approach assumes this property of micro-level interactions more strongly conditions macro-level outcomes compared to the precise details of individual choice...

In this paper, the authors explore a dynamical version of the Aoki and Yoshikawa model (AYM) for an economy driven by demand. They show that when an appropriate Markovian dynamics is taken into account, the AYM has different equilibrium distributions depending on the form of transition...

A large market economy has a huge number of degrees of freedom with weak microlevel coordination. The 'implicit microfoundations' approach considers this property of micro-level interactions to more strongly determine macro-level outcomes compared to the precise details of individual choice...

This paper examines how time to build alters strategic investment behaviour under oligopoly. Facing demand uncertainty, firms decide whether to invest early or wait until uncertainty has been resolved. A game that captures time-to-build investment is contrasted with another one in which...

This paper deals with estimating small tail probabilities of thesteady-state waiting time in a GI/GI/1 queue withheavy-tailed (subexponential) service times. The problem ofestimating infinite horizon ruin probabilities in insurancerisk processes with heavy-tailed claims can be transformed into...

In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.

This paper proposes an alternative, dynamic framework for estimatingtime-varying values of travel time savings and values of schedule delay, in whichtime-preferences are represented as the time-varying excess willingness to pay(EWPT) to being in the one location, over being elsewhere. It is...

A monopolist in public transport may oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum, as van Reeven (2008) demonstrates with homogeneous consumers. This result generalizes for heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable. Whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends...