The Pre-commitment Advantage of Having a Slow Legislative System

In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Frijters, Paul ; Tieman, Alexander F.
Publisher:	Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Demokratie \| Gesetzgebung \| Zeitökonomie \| Theorie \| time-inconsistency \| legislation \| irreversible investments

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Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 01-008/3
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	834102455 [GVK] hdl:10419/85983 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20010008 [RePEc]
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics ; K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324955