We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model that distinguishes supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relationship...

Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...

Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...

Credit Rating Agencies play a key role in European capital markets today, publishing ratings on the creditworthiness of issuers/issues of debt securities. Independent, objective and internationally consistent credit ratings raise the integrity, transparency and competitiveness of capital...

The question of third-party access to the networks has become central to the debate around the liberalisation of the European electricity markets due to the natural monopoly characteristic of the transmission network. The European Union?s electricity directive provides three institutional...

Die Bundesregierung hat einen Gesetzentwurf zur Zusammenlegung der deutschen Bundesaufsichtsämter vorgelegt. Welchen neuen Anforderungen muß sich die Finanzaufsicht stellen? Wie ist eine Zentralisierung der Aufsicht im europäischen Kontext zu beurteilen?

Das neue deutsche Energiewirtschaftsrecht greift bei der Deregulierung nicht weit genug. Insbesondere sollten Stromerzeugung und Stromendverkauf vollständig dereguliert werden. Lediglich der Stromtransport ist nach wie vor einer Regulierung zu unterziehen. Unter den technisch-ökonomischen...

We consider an inspection game between $n$ polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not...