concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement … theory. …

from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …

-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come … signatories - the coalition size - are determined. This paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding …

antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …

developing countries) enter a coalition only if they do not have to reduce as much. While equity preferences improve upon the … in population size and per capita emissions, generally no coalition will be stable without restrictions on entry into or … exit out of a coalition. In such a situation, equity-orientation does not improve upon the prospects for cooperation. …

non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries' welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …

control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to coalition formation is used to analyse profitability and stability of the … countries, carbon leakage reduces the size of the equilibrium coalition and even the likelihood of a successful negotiation. On …

of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition …