We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, more efficient workers invest more often in education and employers offer...

In the extensive job search literature, studies assume either sequential or non-sequential search. Which assumption is more reasonable? This paper introduces a novel method to test the hypothesis that firms search sequentially based on the relationship between the number of (rejected) job...

The paper studies how social connections affect firm-level hiring decisions and performance. We characterize the social connections of firms' employees using register data and for causal identification we use job displacements, which create directed positive shocks towards connected firms by...

In dieser Studie wird die Wirkung der Rekrutiererfreundlichkeit und -kompetenz auf den Bewerber und dessen Absicht, den Bewerbungsprozess weiter zu verfolgen, empirisch analysiert. Als theoretisches Fundament dienen das Signaling und die Theory of Reasoned Action. Unter Zuhilfenahme eines...

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effect that unemployed want to avoid getting a benefit sanction...