We study the valuation of unit-linked life insurance contracts with surrender guarantees. Instead of solving an optimal stopping problem, we propose a more realistic approach accounting for policyholders’ rationality in exercising their surrender option. The valuation is conducted at the...

The current study integrates the repeated game approach to implicit contracts and the analysis of explicit bonus rules based on subjective performance evaluation to determine the optimal structure of the compensation scheme for the average white- collar employee. In contrast to previous...

Dieser Beitrag behandelt Begriff, Ursachen, Wirkungen sowie Bewertung und mögliche Ausgleichsmaßnahmen gestörter Vertragsparität. Dabei wird auf die ökonomische Verhandlungstheorie und die Theorie der Wettbewerbsmärkte zurückgegriffen. Es werden in der Rechtswissenschaft vorfindbare...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party...

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...

The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation...

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent...

Subjective performance evaluation is modeled as auditing without commitment. A superior, who has to decide whether an where to audit the work done by a subordinate, takes into account all interim information he has obtained in the meantime. This invites workers to cover up and withhold...

Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture...