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Strategic pricing of financial options
Bieta, Volker; Broll, Udo; Milde, Hellmuth; Siebel, Wilfried - 2009
need an approach explaining interdependent actions. Game theory is in a position to offer proper olutions. This paper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301361
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United We Vote
Eguia, Jon X. - 2006
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and … rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312299
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Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: The average vote example
Renault, Régis; Trannoy, Alain - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 497-513
The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317062
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Trade retaliation in a monetary-trade model
Whalley, John; Yu, Jun; Zhang, Shunming - 2009
We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264539
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Ambiguous act equilibria
Bade, Sophie - 2010
A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the e ect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of 'independent strategies' as well as of 'common priors' are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270432
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Optimal tariffs, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model
Felbermayr, Gabriel; Jung, Benjamin; Larch, Mario - 2011
This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274758
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Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players
Banerjee, Abhijit; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334668
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The theory of implementation of social choice rules
Serrano, Roberto - 2003
. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this “social engineering” problem and provides answers to the … question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948
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Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - 2021
The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012603361
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The New Basel Accord and the Nature of Risk: A Game Theoretic Perspective
Siebe, Wilfried; Milde, Hellmuth; Broll, Udo; Bieta, Volker - 2007
– game theory is a useful set of tools for better understanding different risk settings. Embedded in a short history of the … Basel Accord in this article we introduce some basic ideas of game theory in the context of rating procedures in accordance … with Basel II. As well, some insight is given how game theory works. Here, the primary value of game theory stems from its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296819