Strong and coalition-proof political quilibria under plurality and runoff rule
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Messner, Matthias ; Polborn, Mattias |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 35.2007, 2, p. 287-314
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game |
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