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The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees
Kóczy, László Á.; Pintér, Péter Miklós - 2011
Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast 'yes' or 'no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as 'yes' or 'no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494482
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A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value
Voorneveld, Mark; Grahn, Sofia - 2001
A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321738
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A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery
Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk - 2004
The paper sets up a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model among the major agents exploiting the cod stock in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one-point solution concepts. The paper identifies the problem with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321960
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Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution
van den Brink, René - 2004
A situation in which a finite set of players can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325253
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On the Impossibility of Fair Risk Allocation
Csóka, Péter; Pintér, Péter Miklós - 2011
Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of … portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by … using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494462
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The Shapley value for shortest path games
Pintér, Péter Miklós; Radványi, Anna - 2012
In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benefit too. The problem is to divide the profit of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494527
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Cooperative games: Core and shapley value
Serrano, Roberto - 2007
This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318970
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Az ellenzék ereje: Általános súlyozott szavazási játékok
Kóczy, László Á.; Pintér, Péter Miklós - 2010
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494447
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Electing the Pope
Kóczy, László Á.; Sziklai, Balázs - 2013
Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualified majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a well-known public gure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494540
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Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael B.; Shalev, Jonathan - 1998
We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for a fixed number of periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608403