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Power, rent extraction, and executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian; Fried, Jesse - In: CESifo Forum 03 (2002) 3, pp. 23-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695703

Managerial ownership and firm performance in German small and medium-sized enterprises

Mueller, Elisabeth; Spitz, Alexandra - 2001

which managers could become entrenched, they already bear a large proportion of the costs and have therefore an incentive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297809

Loss of control vs. risk reduction: decision factors for hiring non-family CFOs in family firms

Lutz, Eva; Schraml, Stephanie; Achleitner, Ann-Kristin - 2010

explore the perceptions of family firm owners towards external managers by analyzing how their family-specific and company … providers. Prior work: Prior research has acknowledged that the attitude to external managers is a major concern for family … independence and control is high. Furthermore, they do not seem to trust external managers to act in accordance to their goal of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305711

Are Forced Turnovers Good or Bad News?

Kind, Axel; Schläpfer, Yves - 2011

To gain insights about the quality of board's firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand- collected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390666

Learning from the past: trends in executive compensation over the twentieth century

Frydman, Carola - 2008

with the evolution in executive pay and the market for managers during earlier time periods. A case study of General …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264485

Executive compensation, firm performance, and chaebols in Korea: evidence from new panel data

Kato, Takao; Kim, Woochan; Lee, Ju Ho - 2005

This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267324

Social networks in the boardroom

Kramarz, Francis; Thesmar, David - 2006

This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the facts that (1) social networks may strongly affect board composition and (2) social networks may be detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a unique dataset on executives and outside directors of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267612

Firm performance and managerial turnover: the case of Ukraine

Muravyev, Alexander; Talavera, Oleksandr; Bilyk, Olga; … - 2009

ownership and supervisory board size, we do find significant entrenchments effects associated with ownership by managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271280

The value relevance of top executive departures: evidence from the Netherlands

Cools, Kees; van Praag, C. Mirjam - 2007

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276315

Hanging Together, Together Hung? Career Implications of Interpersonal Ties Between CEOs and Top Managers

Hilger, Stefan; Richter, Ansgar; Schäffer, Utz - In: BuR - Business Research 6 (2013) 1, pp. 8-32

Is it good or bad for senior executives to have strong interpersonal ties to the CEO? We argue that a strong relationship with the CEO raises the likelihood that a top manager stays in office or makes an upward career move when the CEO leaves office voluntarily. At the same time, such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421378

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