Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a … communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to …

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds … strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects tend to wait for others to send a message when communication is … costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication takes …

We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre … communication. Consistent with the introspective character of GW-FI, the fraction of players who achieve efficient coordination by …

We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have … is applied to finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that honest communication and play of the Pareto … dominant Nash equilibrium together characterize the unique evolutionarily stable set in generic and symmetric n×n-coordination …

is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the … desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make … coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein's result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding …