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We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336001
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336057
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480849
collective action in the context of finitely repeated intergroup conflict and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281661
We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291669
We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291837
We conduct a contribution game for a real public good and show that when the contributors value the real public good highly, they increase their contributions in each round. Thus, contrary to previous literature, free riding decreases over rounds and the end-game effect is reversed.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293102
We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293401
We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the U.S.A. than anywhere else.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293430
Die EU hat durch die Zinsenrichtlinie einerseits eindeutig von einer Politik, die auf einem Vertrauen gegenüber dem Bürger und einer gewissen Selbstbestimmung beruhte, zu einer Vorgehensweise gewechselt die durch Misstrauen und Kontrolle geprägt ist. Andererseits erscheinen die Regelungen der...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294497