its equilibrium strategy in a repeated but finite game, in order to build an environmental reputation if we suppose that … reputation. Due to the peculiarity of environmental information (green products are credence goods), we claim that an explicit … the reputation effect. …

Is the reputation of a firm tradeable when the previous owner has to retire even though ownership change is observable … good type. Hence reputation is tradeable, although ownership change is observable. In our model, reputation is an …

reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a 'two-tier equilibrium' in which 'reputable …' auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of losing reputation, while 'disreputable' auditors accept bribes because … even persistent refusal does not create a good reputation. The main findings are: (a) honest auditors charge higher fees …

, by grading honestly, a school can build up reputation. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established signaling …

determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by … interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price …

determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher …