-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification …Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer … maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be …

-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification …Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer … maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be …

-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence seller-induced certification acts as a signalling device. Seller …Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …-induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and …

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We …

convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality … external certification. We also show that the potential to signal quality is improved if consumers condition their beliefs on … the source of information, namely whether information comes from external certification or from random detection. …

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We …