We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...

The benefits and costs of different forms of job design have been analyzed in the literature yet. The focus has thereby mostly been on job designs under formal contracts between the parties. However, in the real world relational contracts - informal agreements sustained by the value of future...

Zahlreiche Studien weisen auf hohe Misserfolgsquoten von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen hin, messen dies jedoch vor allem anhand finanzieller Indikatoren, während eine mitarbeiterbezogene Betrachtung unterbleibt. Kritisch wird die Situation, wenn hochqualifizierte, aber unzufriedene...

Die Studie präsentiert die Ergebnisse der 10. HR-Expertenbefragung mit der Zeitschrift Personalwirtschaft über ausgewählte Teilaspekte des Internationalen Personalmanagements. Themenschwerpunkte sind u.a. die Strategien zur personalpolitischen Steuerung von Auslandsstandorten,...

This paper introduces a new data source available for HRM researchers and personnel economists, the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP). The LPP is a longitudinal and representative employer-employee data set covering establishments in Germany and designed for quantitative empirical HR research. The...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...