We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding … experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can …

The way in which individual expectations shape aggregate macroeconomic variables is crucial for the transmission and … effectiveness of monetary policy. We study the individual expectations formation process and the interaction with monetary policy …, within a standard New Keynesian model, by means of laboratory experiments with human subjects. Three aggregate outcomes are …

We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even … relied on individual bidders. Our results show that teams stay on average longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction … winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since the bidders with the highest valuation are …

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after … discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform … price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller …

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and … the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first …