Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

This study analysed the contribution of economic growth and redistribution components to aggregate poverty changes in Ireland from 1987-2005, using the Shapley value decomposition approach. The analysis used the household disposable income data from the Household Budget Survey to calculate...

This paper prices the risk of climate change by calculating a lower bound for the price of a virtual insurance policy against climate risks associated with the business as usual (BAU) emissions path. In analogy with ordinary insurance pricing, this price depends on the current risk to which...

We provide an axiomatization-based justification for applying the Owen value to decompose R2 in OLS models if prior knowledge can be used to form groups of regressor variables. The assumptions made by the axioms are not only plausible with respect to the variables but also clarify the meaning of...

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players' possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...

The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in...

The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in...

A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

The paper sets up a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model among the major agents exploiting the cod stock in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one-point solution concepts. The paper identifies the problem with...

This study decomposes both the labor productivity gap and the labor productivity growth into the contributions of technical efficiency, capital deepening and technological change for Mexican manufacturing at the regional level. In order to do so, we apply a methodology that combines two...