Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | van den Brink, René ; Chun, Youngsub ; Ju, Yuan |
Publisher: |
Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute |
Subject: | Queueing problem | minimal transfer rule | maximal transfer rule | Shapley value | bidding mechanism | implementation | Queuing problem |
Series: | Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 14-016/II |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 777908611 [GVK] hdl:10419/98868 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20140016 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General |
Source: |
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Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts
Brink, Rene van den, (2014)
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Auctioning and selling positions : a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts
Brink, René van den, (2014)
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Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
Ju, Yuan, (2014)
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Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
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Auctioning and Selling Positions : A Non-Cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts
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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
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