We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance characteristics and political connections of directors on the profitability of banks in Pakistan. The study uses the data of 26 domestic banks over the latest and large period of 2007-2016. Our findings firstly affirm that bank...

After the end of communism enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were marked by low levels of labor productivity, mainly because of too high employment levels. According to economic theory, the corporate capital structure can be an important element in the restructuring process. But...

We investigate whether ownership concentration influences bank profitability in a developing country context. We focus on bank ownership concentration measured as the amount of direct equity held by a majority shareholder categorised into: high ownership concentration, moderate ownership...

Our research tests the difference in investment efficiency between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms and then evaluates the effect of privatisation and equitisation policies on the investment efficiency of former state owned enterprises (SOEs). We use a novel dataset from Viet Nam...

This paper sets forth a pair of distinctive contributions to the subject. In the first place, it provides a unified approach to capital investment decisions, by means of a two-tiered framework of analysis. Such approach consists in working out the net present value of the project by discounting...

This paper investigates the impacts of defined-benefit (DB) pension plans on the corporate investment choices between diversifying and non-diversifying investments. We find a firm's DB plan coverage is negatively associated with its propensity of making a major investment. Subject to a major...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards influences investment efficiency and identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project, gathers investment-relevant information, and decides whether or not to...

In their role as initiators of new business projects, CEOs have an advantage over access to and control over project-related information. This exacerbates pre-existing agency frictions and may lead to investment inefficiencies. To counteract this challenge, incentive compensation for corporate...

We investigate how borrowers corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with...