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Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts
Herz, Holger; Schmutzler, Armin; Volk, André - 2016
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663192
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Identity, homophily and in-group bias
Currarini, Sergio; Menge, Friederike - 2012
Many Social Interactions display either or both of the following well documented phenomena. People tend to interact with similar others (homophily). And they tend to treat others more favorably if they are perceived to share the same identity (in-group bias). While both phenomena involve some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282981
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Inferring preferences from choices under uncertainty
Kuzmics, Christoph - 2012
If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty à la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319975
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Estimating Individual Ambiguity Aversion: A Simple Approach
Gneezy, Uri; Imas, Alex; List, John A. - 2015
We introduce a simple, easy to implement instrument for jointly eliciting risk and ambiguity attitudes. Using this instrument, we structurally estimate a two-parameter model of preferences. Our findings indicate that ambiguity aversion is significantly overstated when risk neutrality is assumed....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500387
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Choice, deferral, and consistency
Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Cueva, Carlos; Gerasimou, Georgios - In: Quantitative Economics 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1297-1318
We report on two novel choice experiments with real goods where subjects in one treatment are forced to choose, as is … the norm in economic experiments, while in the other they are not but can instead incur a small cost to defer choice … by rational choice. Our results suggest that nonforced-choice experiments and models can be helpful in separating people …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536896
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Entitlements and obligations
Schlicht, Ekkehart - 2016
Market interactions are brought about by the interplay of entitlements and obligations. Entitlements are rights, as perceived by the individuals. They are subjectively perceived rights that go along with a motivational disposition to defend them. Obligations are the counterparts of entitlements....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626627
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The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives: An Experiment
Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - 2009
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325755
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Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types
Nikolowa, Radoslawa - 2014
We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics as well as the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381011
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The rise of individual performance pay
Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond - 2007
Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human capital intensive industries? We present a model that may explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264248
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Making sense of non-binding retail-price recommendations
Buehler, Stefan; Gärtner, Dennis L. - 2010
We model non-binding retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device facilitating coordination in vertical supply relations. Assuming both repeated vertical trade and asymmetric information about production costs, we show that RPRs may be part of a relational contract,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270481