which it is more realistic to assume a ßuctuating discount factor. In a repeated oligopoly, as the interest rate changes, so …

Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the … discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price …

cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit … is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market …

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in … antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …

cartelized industry. This paper endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a numeric simulation model where firms differ in … marginal costs and production technologies. The paper models the incentive to collude in a differentiated products Bertrand-oligopoly …

The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital …

significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal …