The of this study is to present the evolution of academic research in venture capital (VC) research between 1990 and 2014. Design/methodology/approach The study analyzes the most influential journals in VC research by analyzing papers, which were published on the Web of Science database....

We propose a specification of a general equilibrium model with securitization of collateral-backed promises and discuss the role of physical collateral to avoid, in equilibrium, pessimistic beliefs about the future rates of default. Promises are pooled in either pass-through securities or...

We consider infinite horizon economies with incomplete financial markets. Securities are in positive net supply and may be infinite-lived. We establish existence of equilibria by requiring borrowing constrains instead of portfolio restrictions..

Introducing assets backed by physical collateral, we extend the Cornet and De Boisdeffre (2002) model of asymmetric information to allow for default. We show that, independently of the financial-informational structure, equilibrium exists.

We state an infinite horizon sequential markets model with real assets in positive net supply and subject to credit risk. By introducing default-dependent borrowing constraints, we show the existence of equilibrium.

We show that in economies without liquidity frictions, but with incomplete financial markets, when agents are infinitely lived and uniformly impatient, money can still be essential (that is, have a positive price in equilibrium) if and only if each agent has binding debt constraints at some node...

When infinite lived agents trade long-lived assets secured by durable goods, equilibrium exists without any uniform impatience requirements or additional debt constraints. Asset pricing bubbles are absent when the new endowments of durable goods are uniformly bounded away from zero. Otherwise,...

In infinite horizon incomplete market economies, Ponzi schemes are avoided and equilibrium exists when collateral repossession is the only mechanism enforcing borrowers not to entirely default on their promises. In these economies, we add default enforcement mechanisms that are effective, i.e....