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Verringern Management-Entlohnungskosten die Agency-Kosten? Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen
Crespi-Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246
In the UK, the top executive remuneration policy is not geared towards the creation of value but compensation revisions are rather driven by changes in corporate size, measured by sales growth. This suggests that managing larger firms requires special managerial skills. Even in UK companies with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377541
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How to Avoid Compensating CEO for Luck: The Case of Microeconomic Fluctuations
Oxelheim, Lars; Wihlborg, Clas; Zhang, Jianhua - 2010
Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration. These influences can be seen as reflecting luck from the CEO's perspective. In this chapter we present a model for how to avoid compensating CEO for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320333
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What explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A panel data analysis for 1977-2009
Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - 2012
work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281035
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What explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A panel data analysis for 1977 - 2009
Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - 2012
work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282632
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Executive compensation and the susceptibility of firms to hostile takeovers. An empirical investigation of the U.S. oil industry
Nowak, Eric; Haid, Michael H. - 1999
We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316286
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CEO compensation
Frydman, Carola; Jenter, Dirk - 2010
result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285538
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The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO pay for luck
Paligorova, Teodora - 2008
According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their controlget paid for luck. In this paper, I find that the independence requirement imposed on boards of directors by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280049
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Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?
Cronqvist, Henrik; Heyman, Fredrik; Nilsson, Mattias; … - 2005
with an agency model in which entrenched managers pay high wages because they come with private benefits, such as lower … find that entrenched managers pay their workers more. For example, our estimates show that CEOs with more control rights … (votes) than all other blockholders together, pay their workers about 6%, or $2,200 per year, higher wages. Since cash flow …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320116
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Power, rent extraction, and executive compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian; Fried, Jesse - In: CESifo Forum 03 (2002) 3, pp. 23-28
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695703
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Aktienbasierte Langfristanreize im Rahmen der Vorstandsverguetung: Evidenz auf Basis Deutscher Prime Standard Unternehmen
Rapp, Marc Steffen; Schaller, Philipp; Wolff, Michael - 2009
While in the US stock-based incentives are commonly used since the 50s of the last century, in Germany they were invented only some ten years ago. Even in 1996 firms faced considerable regulatory difficulties when willing to grant such incentives. In the meantime the legal environment has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305700