This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information … be contracted for. With these simple contracts, we show that delegation is an alternative to contracting to elicit agent … sequence of decisions, the information learned by the principal can be used for the other decisions. So delegation is only …

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is … with delegation, is valuable for the principal if she retains control over the second decision. Hence, this paper provides … a new rational for partial delegation: a transfer of control to the better-informed party can be used by the supervisor …

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their …

signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy where preferences do not satisfy the single-crossing condition …

be understood as an equilibrium outcome of a signaling game between parents of girls and prospective suitors. We identify …

opportunity costs as the basis for the inverse trade-conflict relationship, thus implying that one need not rely on signaling. …

This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in … final round. I analyze this signaling effect and characterize the equilibrium in this game. Compared to the benchmark model …, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place …

We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the … show that limited awareness of actions improves communication in such signalling games: the principal makes a coarser …