Showing 1 - 10 of 1,189
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d?Aspremont and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273735
In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321813
the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318970
convex-valued. I use the corresponding consistency property and its converse to axiomatize the inner core for games that are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318946
We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected … of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318981
'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270938
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270946
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270949
would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270953