The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d?Aspremont and …

In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …

the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two …

'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

the clan by a 'dualize and extend' procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …

players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is … stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the … semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which …

convex-valued. I use the corresponding consistency property and its converse to axiomatize the inner core for games that are …