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The effect of employee stock options on bank investment choice, borrowing, and capital
Mehran, Hamid; Rosenberg, Joshua - 2007
In this paper, we assess the effects of CEO stock options on three key corporate policies for banks: investment choice, amount of borrowing, and level of capital. Using a sample of 549 bank-years for publicly traded banks from 1992 to 2002, we find that stock option grants lead CEOs to undertake...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283469
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Executive compensation and the susceptibility of firms to hostile takeovers. An empirical investigation of the U.S. oil industry
Nowak, Eric; Haid, Michael H. - 1999
We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316286
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Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: Experimental Evidence
Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M. - 2011
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427611
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Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?
Cronqvist, Henrik; Heyman, Fredrik; Nilsson, Mattias; … - 2005
find that entrenched managers pay their workers more. For example, our estimates show that CEOs with more control rights … as evidence of agency problems between shareholders and managers affecting workers' pay. The findings do not appear to be … with an agency model in which entrenched managers pay high wages because they come with private benefits, such as lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320116
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Power, rent extraction, and executive compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian; Fried, Jesse - In: CESifo Forum 03 (2002) 3, pp. 23-28
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695703
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The Failure of Northern Rock: A multi-dimensional Case Study
Congdon, Tim; Goodhart, Charles A.E.; Eisenbeis, Robert A. - 2009
In August 2007 the United Kingdom experienced its first bank run in over 140 years. Although Northern Rock was not a particularly large bank (it was at the time ranked 7th in terms of assets) it was nevertheless a significant retail bank and a substantial mortgage lender. In fact, ten years...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689937
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Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung
Koch, Rosemarie; Stadtmann, Georg - 2010
Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303781
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CEO compensation
Frydman, Carola; Jenter, Dirk - 2010
result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285538
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Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance
Luo, Yongli - In: Cogent Economics & Finance 2 (2014) 1, pp. 1-17
employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers' discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559138
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Trading away incentives
Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Xia, Shuo - 2022
, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013412974