Showing 1 - 10 of 4,854
players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264918
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291803
For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301733
experiment. First, a model is analyzed in which two agents simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy and we allow …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268692
Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an … appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267284
We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of … contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players … the defence of the opponent. This model has many applications like political campaigning, wars, competition among lobbies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312400
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome in an electoral contest … candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent wins the contest in case of a tie. Theory predicts that in the presence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291825
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning … systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263109
This paper examines how cooperation in an insurance game depends on risk preferences and the riskiness of income. It considers a dynamic game where commitment is limited, and characterizes the level of cooperation as measured by the reciprocal of the discount factor above which perfect risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494384
players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333998