We explore how innovation incentives in a small, open economy should be designed in order to achieve the highest welfare and growth, by means of a computable general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous technological change embodied in varieties of capital. We study policy alternatives...

The density of fuel filling stations influences consumers' utility of private car transport. Thus, to the extent that different modes of private transport require different fuels, there may exist a network externality in the consumption of private transport. We investigate this in a formal model...

This paper studies the timing of subsidies for environmental research and development (R&D) and how innovation policy is influenced by the costs of emissions. We use a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with both general R&D and specific environmental R&D. We find two results...

An important policy question is whether research and development (R&D) in new, emerging technologies should be more subsidized than R&D in other more mature technologies. In this paper I analyze if innovation externalities caused by knowledge spillovers from private firms may warrant a...

We analyze how knowledge spillovers influence the optimal timing of R&D policy. Using numerical simulations we find that optimal subsidies to R&D may be rising over time even when the returns to knowledge is decreasing. The optimal time profile of the subsidies is determined by the elasticity of...

The major claim in Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn & Hemous (2012) (AABH) is that subsidies for research and development of clean technologies are more important than carbon taxes when dealing with climate change. However, they - unconventionally - assume that a patent only lasts for one period. In...

The "resource curse" is a potential threat to all countries relying on export income from abundant natural resources such as fossil fuels. The early literature hypothesized that easily accessible natural resources would lead to lack of technological progress. In this article we instead propose...

We study the private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians. Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician-bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of bureaucrats ran for political...

We report results from a dictator game experiment with nurse students and real estate broker students as dictators, and Amnesty International as the recipient. Although brokers contributed substantial amounts, nurses contributed significantly more, on average 76 percent of their endowment. In a...

Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this...