Showing 1 - 10 of 13,071
We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325236
We model a firm in an institutional market setting, consisting of a production technology and its governance. The governance consists of a hierarchical firm structure, a cost efficiency parameter,and an internal pay system. The depth of the firm is determined by profit maximization under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325411
incomplete contract theory. We use the framework of Aghionand Tirole (1997) and define the managerial control structure as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325682
This paper studies the impact of innovation on the organizational structure. The theoretical framework predicts that a larger parental pool of knowledge raises the probability of offshoring. This holds in a national as well as an international context. However, when the producer loses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334032
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262786
This paper studies the impact of innovation on the organizational structure. The theoretical framework predicts that a larger parental pool of knowledge raises the probability of oshoring. This holds in a national as well as an international context. However, when the producer loses territorial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427568
This note points out the differences between conducting several projects within one big firm (common ownership) and conducting each project within an independent firm (separate ownership).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317642
We develop a theory of organization design in which the firm's structure is chosen to mitigate moral hazard problems in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270350
Law firms are expected to be controlled by the workers because given the diffculty of monitoring labor, the transaction cost would be very high and the essential human capital investment would be lacking in a firm controlled by the capital suppliers. Expectations are confirmed by the data....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011807196
This paper presents a critical overview of some recent attempts at building formal models of organizations as information-processing and problem-solving entities. We distinguish between two classes of models according to two distinct objects of analysis. The first class includes models mainly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328477