concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement … theory. …

from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …

control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to coalition formation is used to analyse profitability and stability of the … countries, carbon leakage reduces the size of the equilibrium coalition and even the likelihood of a successful negotiation. On …

of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition …

cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule …

international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a … climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge … despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries …