This paper examines the role of bank capital in decision-making by bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States. Following Chami and Cosimano’s (2001) call option approach to bank capital, BHCs optimally choose the amount of capital to insure the bank against becoming capital...

This article investigates the gender diversity of the corporate board of European Union banks. Employing a large sample of 612 European banks from 20 European countries, it identifies organizational characteristics that could be predictive of women’s presence on bank boards. We identify three...

The Russian corporate governance has evolved since the 1998 financial crisis. The author examines both normalization and preservation in the corporate structure, which can simultaneously be observed in the adaptation of Russian enterprises. The Russian corporate governance reflects the unique...

Dividend policy is one of the most intriguing topics in financial research. Even now, economists provide considerable attention and thought to solving the dividend puzzle, resulting a large number of conflicting hypotheses, theories and explanations. This paper aims to determine the dividend...

The object of this contribution is to address the question of the ownership of the firm. Both law and economics shape representations of the world: law focuses on rules and justice; economics focuses on efficiency and allocation. They describe common situations and "objects'' such as firms and...

In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...

This paper aims to examine the effect of many ownership features on firm's disclosure quality using the theoretical framework of the agency theory, which states that investors information demand increases with agency costs of the firm. Public ownership increases agency costs and therefore should...

We investigate whether handsomely rewarding bank executives’ realizes superior efficiency by determining if executive remuneration contracts produce incentives that offset potential agency problems and lead to improvements in bank efficiency. We calculate executive Delta and Vega to proxy...

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