Abstract. Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferableutility, cooperative game, featuring risk averse players. Like in competitive equilibrium, a core solution is determined by shadow prices on state-dependent claims. And like in finance, no risk can properly be priced only in terms...

Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the...

We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focus is on communication structures where the set of players forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph....

It is possible to have income effects on more than one good in utility profiles that lead to Transferable Utility (TU) and in the presence of many private and many public goods. Assuming that the utility functions are of the Generalized Quasi-linear (GQL) form is not necessary for TU to hold. I...

Considered here is direct exchange of production allowances or input factors. Motivated by practical modeling and compution, we suppose every owner or user of such items has a linear technology. The issue is whether competitive market equilibrium can be reached merely via iterated bilateral...

We structurally estimate a perfect information bargaining model of collective negotiations using data on national agreements for Spain. The model is a stochastic model of sequential bargaining in which we allow for the possibility of negotiations ending without agreement, a common feature in the...

The paper studies the role of delegation and authority within a principal-agent relation in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. Consequently, an information...