We consider situations in which a principal tries to induce an agent to spend e®ort on accumulating a state variable that a®ects the well-being of both parties. The only incentive mechanism that the principal can use is a state-dependent transfer of her own utility to the agent. Formally, the...

We extend the model of insecure property rights by Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents...

[fre] Nous montrons que quand des firmes polluantes sont des concurrents à la Cournot, elles peuvent avoir une incitation à utiliser des permis de pollution comme moyen indirect de coordonner leur production. Si les firmes sont initialement identiques, les échanges de permis peuvent conduire...

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich [<italic>Journal of the European Economic Association</italic>, 2009], showing that a marginal increase of risk in...

This paper explains how, in the context of incomplete coordination among all countries, unilateral policies that might at first sight seem pro-green could actually turn out to harm the global environment. The free-riding motives and the difficulty of reaching an effective international...

This paper reviews the game-theoretic literature on collaborative environmental management. It begins with a survey of static models of international environmental agreements (IEAs), comparing their underlying assumptions and their results. Extensions of the basic model to allow for both...

This paper provides general theorems about the control that maxi- mizes the mixed Bentham-Rawls (MBR) criterion for intergenerational justice, which was introduced in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009). We establish sufficient concavity conditions for a candidate trajectory to be optimal and...

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that inuences the evolution of a state variable, and decide...

This paper contributes to the green paradox literature by using a resource extraction framework with heterogeneous energy sources. A key feature of the model is a capacity constrained green backstop resource, which implies the simultaneous use of the expensive backstop resource and the cheaper...