This paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after elections. We add to the existing literature by using this analysis to predict what government may emerge from these elections. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media,...

This paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after political elections, and as a di¤erence with some previous papers, this analysis is used to give a prediction of what government can emerge from these elections.

In this paper we define manipulation with restricted beliefs as the possibility for some voter to have an insincere preference ordering that dominates the sincere one within the given individual beliefs over other agents' preferences. We then show that all non-dictatorial voting schemes are...

The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable utility cooperative game. We provide here an exhaustive determination of the bargaining set of any three-player game, balanced or not,...

Metric rationalization of social decision rules has been intensively investigated when the social outcome is a nonempty subset of alternatives. The present paper proposes a similar framework for social welfare functions (SWFs)—that is when each social outcome is a ranking of alternatives. A...

Arrow’s theorem [1963] states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satis.es completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Pareto principle is necessarily dictatorial in the sense that the social decision on any pair of candidates coincides...

In this paper, we study values for TU-games which satisfy three classical properties: Linearity, efficiency and symmetry. We give the general analytical form of these values and their relation with the Shapley value and the Egalitarian value.

In this paper, we study values for TU-games which satisfy three classical properties: Linearity, efficiency and symmetry. We give the general analytical form of these values and their relation with the Shapley value and the Egalitarian value.