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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Power, rent extraction, and executive compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian; Fried, Jesse - In: CESifo Forum 3 (2002) 3, pp. 23-28
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998677
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Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963
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Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation
Brochet, Francois; Srinivasan, Suraj - In: Journal of Financial Economics 111 (2014) 2, pp. 430-449
express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737663
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Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations
Heitzman, Shane - In: Journal of Financial Economics 102 (2011) 2, pp. 251-271
I investigate the determinants and consequences of granting equity to the target's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) during deal negotiations. These negotiation grants likely reflect information about the acquisition, benefit from the deal premium, and provide more timely bargaining incentives. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571669
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CEO deal-making activities and compensation
Fich, Eliezer M.; Starks, Laura T.; Yore, Adam S. - In: Journal of Financial Economics 114 (2014) 3, pp. 471-492
Using transactions generally overlooked in the compensation literature—joint ventures, strategic alliances, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and spin-offs—we find that, beyond compensation for increases in firm size or complexity, chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076294
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The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK
Renneboog, Luc; Trojanowski, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002
mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders.We find that both the CEO's industry-adjusted monetary compensation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092291
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Control of Mergers and Defense of Enterprises during Financial Crisis
BANULESCU, Viorel; POPESCU-CRUCERU, Anca Sorina; … - In: Romanian Statistical Review Supplement 60 (2012) 3, pp. 15-19
The Merger Regulation has been imposed as natural consequence of the need to provide a correspondent evolution of the … market, as default of a perfect competition. The main purpose of the merger control aims to ensure a regulation of the … standard in art. 2 of the Merger Regulation no. 139/2004, in the same time embodying the causality relationship between any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010859969
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Procedural Aspects Regarding the Merger Control Within the EU
Viorel, Bãnulescu; Anca, Popesu-Cruceru; … - In: Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series XII (2012) 2, pp. 129-134
The European examination process of mergers proposes an efficient analysis, transparent and adjusted to merger … economical circumstances. The European examination of merger has an administrative side ant the European Commission itself has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010838980